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INHERENCY

Status Quo policy is pressing for reforms in Egypt

Jeremy Sharp 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 5 June 2014 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

The Obama Administration has attempted to craft a policy toward Egypt that seeks a middle ground, continuing strong military-to-military ties without condoning Egypt’s crackdown against dissent. President Obama remarked in a May 28 speech at West Point that:   
In Egypt, we acknowledge that our relationship is anchored in security interests – from the peace treaty with Israel, to shared efforts against violent extremism. So we have not cut off cooperation with the new government. But we can and will persistently press for the reforms that the Egyptian people have demanded.

Balanced approach: It’s vital to maintain a good relationship with Egypt, but at the same time we are currently talking with them about reform

Jeremy Sharp 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 5 June 2014 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

Secretary of State John Kerry has told Congress that for U.S.-Egyptian cooperation to improve, the Egyptian government needs to be less heavy-handed against dissent. According to Secretary Kerry:   
Egypt is a very vital relationship. It's a quarter of the Arab world. It has always been sort of the hub of the region, if you will. It faces some enormous challenges right now. And we're well aware of that. We want this interim transitional government to succeed. We are committed to try to help make that happen. But they need to help us to help them at the same time, by implementing some of the reforms that we've been talking with them about, with respect to inclusivity, journalists, some of the arrests and so forth.

HARMS / SIGNIFICANCE

Most Egyptians support current government’s approach. They want stability more than democracy right now

Jeremy Sharp 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 5 June 2014 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

For nearly a year, Egypt’s security apparatus (often referred to as the “Deep State20”), a broad term meant to encompass the conventional military, internal security and police, and intelligence agencies, has reversed personal and political freedoms gained in the wake of the 2011 “revolution.” According to many observers, this campaign has been conducted with a degree of popular support from Egyptians apparently frustrated with the disorder of the post-Mubarak period. According to Egypt expert H.A. Hellyer, “When given the choice between a democratic system that may or may not deliver stability in the short or medium term and a system that is backed by an extremely strong military institution, I think the majority of Egyptians have unfortunately decided that the latter is what they want.”

Egypt is building democracy and we should be patient as their democratic institutions develop

Dr. Herbert London 2014. (PhD; president emeritus of Hudson Institute; President, London Center for Policy Research; former [John M. Olin](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_M._Olin) Professor of [Humanities](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Humanities) at New York University) Egypt Needs US Aid to Fight Extremism 21 July 2014 <http://www.newsmax.com/HerbertLondon/Middle-East-Egypt-Unrest/2014/07/21/id/583815#ixzz3A6zBfmbG>

Since the removal of Morsi last July, Egypt has passed a Constitution that provides more freedom and equality to all Egyptians than they have known in recent history and last month they held a free and fair presidential election. They have followed the democratic roadmap established in July of 2013 to the best of their ability, and are taking tremendous steps in their aspiration to become a democratic society.  Americans of all people know that a lasting Democracy is not made overnight; it takes time, just as it took America hundreds of years to establish democratic institutions, which we ourselves have yet to perfect. We should be patient as Egypt continues down their path in building a “New Egypt” -one with more rights and equality for all Egyptians.

SOLVENCY

Conditioning US military aid to Egypt doesn’t work: We tried in 2007, no reform happened

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

For a donor to condition assistance on a recipient meeting certain goals seems logical. International donor institutions often condition loans on reform in the financial and economic sector. It would seem that there would be a power relationship to exploit. In the case of the U.S.-Egypt aid, however, attempts to condition money had little positive effect. The threat of Congressional conditions in 2007 placed enough pressure on the Egyptian military to exert some additional effort to protect Israel, as it ultimately allocated $23 million of its $1.3 billion in aid to enhance security on its border with Gaza, but the conditions failed in their larger goals of reorienting military expenditures to focus on border security and counterterrorism, and of motivating political reform in Egypt. Moreover the condition campaign increased bilateral tensions and the conditions provided the Mubarak regime an opportunity to grandstand against American intervention.

“No security assistance” would provide even less leverage than we have now

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships” <http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

Now of course the influence and leverage gained through our security assistance does not guarantee a country will listen. In crisis situations, leaders and regimes often act out of desperation, making them more willing to resist our calls and ignore our warnings. This is why we constantly review our security assistance and why we make every effort to be sure it is being used as it was intended. However, in countries where we have limited relations, where we provide no security assistance, our influence is much more limited.

Egypt’s military cannot bring about political reform

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Conversely, as the military receded from politics, the security services gained strength, and came to comprise the bulk of the Egyptian Government’s coercive apparatus. The Egyptian military remained the prime guarantor of stability in times of great crisis, but its influence on day-to-day governing and political reform was slight. A more likely scenario than the Egyptian military forcing the Egyptian government to reform in order to preserve military aid from the U.S., was the Egyptian regime supplementing any shortfall in the event of a reduction.

Withholding funds from Egyptian military aid will not achieve reform goals

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship (ellipses in original)<http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Consecutive U.S. administrations supported the Egyptian military with arms because it was in U.S. strategic interests to bolster the durable peace between Israel and Egypt and to ally itself with a powerful Arab military in the region. But it also viewed the Egyptian military as the possible future arbiter of any domestic crisis in Egypt. This judgment came from the military’s own behavior, as it intervened in domestic affairs only twice in several decades—the bread riots of 1977 and the Central Security Force unrest of 1986, and from sustained interaction with the military-to-military interaction over 30 years. That interaction included the training of thousands of Egyptian military officers in the United States and the stationing of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of American officers in Egypt. A consensus emerged that the military relationship was worth protecting, that the military did not contribute to authoritarianism in Egypt, and that reducing aid would not bring about political reform. In a joint letter to House Leader Nancy Pelosi in 2007, Secretaries Robert Gates and Condoleezza Rice stated this declaratively:  
Egypt has been a partner for peace in the Middle East for almost thirty years. Egypt’s continued tactical and strategic cooperation is essential to sustaining success in the War on Terror, including ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. By facilitating the transit of U.S. naval vessels through the Suez Canal and permitting unfettered overflight access, Egypt has earned the trust of U.S. military commanders in-theater. …Much work remains to be done in promoting human rights, judicial reform and border security in Egypt. Withholding funds destined for the Egyptian military will not help achieve these goals.

Withholding aid won’t change anything in Egypt

Leilia Hilal 2014. (Director of the Middle East Task Force at New America Foundation) Aid to Egypt: Black Hole or Black Gold? 10 Apr 2014 <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/10/aid-to-egypt-black-hole-or-black-gold/h85d?reloadFlag=1>

Nevertheless and irrespective of Egypt’s authoritarian revival, the notion that the US can be effective and engineer change by leveraging foreign assistance is flawed. First, successive administrations have demonstrated that the US will not jeopardize security partnerships in the Middle East for democratic values. Nor would it matter if it did. here is little evidence to suggest that withholding aid significantly impacts domestic decisions of authoritarian regimes.

Other benefactors: Egypt will replace US aid with aid from Saudi Arabia or Russia to avoid pressure for political reform

JERUSALEM POST 2014. (journalist Ariel Ben Solomon) Report: Egypt seeks Russian arms that could undermine treaty with Israel 3 June 2014 <http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Report-Egypt-seeks-Russian-arms-that-could-undermine-treat-with-Israel-344465>

Furthermore, the report notes that “Saudi Arabia’s funding of Egyptian weapons procurements has nullified Washington’s policy of tying military aid to political reform.” Egyptians are paying attention to how Washington is supporting the popular uprising in Ukraine that toppled president Viktor Yanukovich. They compare this to the criticism Washington made of the coup in Egypt. Egyptians see the US as an unreliable ally, stated the report, which led Egyptian army chief Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi “to seek Moscow’s help in diversifying the country’s sources of military procurement.” “Despite reassurances from Egyptian officials, the Russian weapons deal – if concluded – portends a gradual reduction in Washington’s ability to control the quality and quantity of weapons that Cairo receives, and to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region,” concluded the report.

Alternative sources of aid means US leverage is diminished. Cutting aid won’t make Egypt more democratic

Steven Cook 2014. (Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies, Council on Foreign Relations) Aid to Egypt: Black Hole or Black Gold? 10 Apr 2014 <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/10/aid-to-egypt-black-hole-or-black-gold/h85d?reloadFlag=1>

Still, while withholding assistance may be what the Obama administration is legally required to do, this does not mean that it would be good policy. The leverage that might have once been derived from docking Egyptian aid is greatly diminished when the Egyptians have access to alternative and more generous sources of aid, at least in the short run. Once more, cutting is not likely to make Egypt more democratic or less unstable.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Rockets in Gaza

Link: Cutting Egypt military aid will allow Hamas to smuggle rockets into Gaza

Mark Landler 2013. (journalist) US tipped to cut Egypt aid in wake of military crackdown , 10 Oct 2013 THE AGE <http://www.theage.com.au/world/us-tipped-to-cut-egypt-aid-in-wake-of-military-crackdown-20131010-2v9e9.html?skin=text-only>

Of the $US1.3 billion in military aid appropriated this year, about $US585 million had yet to be disbursed when the administration's review began. It had not been deposited in an account in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, where the Egyptian military could use it to buy weapons and spare parts and to pay for maintenance and training. For Mr Obama, the decision on aid is complex because he faces political pressures at home and abroad. Israel, for example, has opposed the cutoff of aid. It fears that the Egyptian military could scale back its security operations in Sinai, allowing the Islamic militant group Hamas to smuggle more rockets through the area to Gaza, where they are fired on Israel.

Impact: Israeli and Palestinian casualties when the rockets are used and Israel retaliates

Fox News 2014. “Israel resumes strikes on targets after rocket fire from Gaza” 8 Aug 2014 <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2014/08/08/rockets-fired-from-gaza-into-israel-idf-says/>

The move came after military officials said Gaza militants had fired a barrage of at least five rockets at southern Israel soon after a three-day truce between Israel and Hamas expired. The Israeli military said it responded with strikes "across Gaza." At least one of the rockets fired from Gaza was intercepted by the Iron Dome system over the southern Israeli city of Ashkelon while two rockets fell in open areas without causing casualties or damage, The Associated Press reported.  Israel responded with a series of its own airstrikes, including one that killed a 10-year-old boy and wounded five children near a Gaza City mosque, Palestinian officials said. Two Israelis were wounded by rocket fire, police said.

2. Camp David Peace Treaty Jeopardized. Egypt could drop out of the peace agreement with Israel

Link & Brink: US military aid is critical to the Israel-Egypt peace treaty

BBC News 2014. (journalist Jonathan Marcus) 13 Feb 2014 “Sisi in Russia: Moscow’s Egyptian Gambit” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26177792>

US military support is written in to the DNA of the Israel-Egypt peace treaty, a triangular relationship that has considerable weight independent of the broader climate between Cairo and Washington. Russia too is not the Soviet Union. It is no superpower and has less to offer Cairo. But this Moscow visit enables the man who may soon be Egypt's elected leader to make a point; to show that Washington is not the only game in town and that up to a point Cairo has choices and friends elsewhere.

Link: US aid to Egypt is directly tied to the Camp David agreement

Leilia Hilal 2014. (Director of the Middle East Task Force at New America Foundation) Aid to Egypt: Black Hole or Black Gold? 10 Apr 2014 <http://carnegieendowment.org/2014/04/10/aid-to-egypt-black-hole-or-black-gold/h85d?reloadFlag=1>

Egypt has been second largest US foreign assistance recipient for more than 3 decades. The first is Israel. This aid triangle is directly tied to the Camp David peace accords. Without a rethinking of the US-Israeli relationship, and the role military contracts play in setting US foreign policy priorities, it is near to impossible that the US would dramatically shift course on aid to Egypt, right or wrong.

Impact: Higher risk of war.

Yarden Gazit 2011. (a research fellow at the Public Policy Center at the Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies. His writings on foreign policy and economics have appeared in major Israeli news media ) Economic and Strategic Ramifications of American Assistance to Israel, Jerusalem Institute for Market Studies <http://jimsisrael.org/pdf/PPusaidEnglish.pdf> (brackets in original)

Israel’s peace treaties with Egypt and Jordan lower the likelihood of war between them, yet the IDF [Israeli Defense Forces] must nevertheless invest considerable resources in maintaining battle readiness in the event of an outbreak of hostilities. The “cold peace” with Egypt, coupled with the fact that it borders no country other than Israel which has a strong army, has left Egypt free to develop its modern efficient army. In addition, the great uncertainty regarding the country’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the Mubarak era means that the IDF must be prepared for any eventuality – even one of very low probability – of a defensive war on either the Egyptian or the Jordanian front.

3. Egypt turns to Russia

Link: Egypt is discussing military cooperation with Russia

Jeremy Sharp 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 5 June 2014 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

In recent months, Egypt and Russia have held several wide ranging discussions on the expansion of military and economic ties41 in an effort that many believe is an Egyptian attempt to demonstrate to the U.S. government that Egypt has alternatives when it comes to military-to-military partnerships. The Egyptian armed forces do maintain Russian tanks and other equipment, though according to the Defense Industry Daily, their high end inventory consists of almost entirely U.S.- origin systems.42 Reportedly, Egypt and Russia may be discussing an arms deal involving the sale of Russian MiG 29 fighters, anti-aircraft systems, and anti-tank missiles worth potentially $2 billion. How Egypt would finance such a purchase is not known, though some sources are suggesting that the Arab Gulf states would provide funding.

Link: Russia will expand influence in the region by taking advantage of US weaker relationship with Egypt

Heba Saleh & Kathrin Hille 2013. (journalists) 14 Nov 2013 Egypt and Russia hail new era of military cooperation <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/8d7c0526-4d48-11e3-bf32-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3A5rQha2U> (brackets added)

“My big picture take is that this is probably an attempt to triangulate to leverage concessions from the US,” said Samuel Charap, senior fellow for Russia and Eurasia at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in Washington. “Given the history, the interoperability and the training issues that the Egyptian military would be taking on, it would seem to be something the military would be loath to do.” However, Russian foreign and security experts said the high-level talks were part of a push by Moscow to take advantage of [US weakness in the Middle East](http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/38298fa2-4713-11e3-bdd2-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk). Analysts say the Russian government feels deeply uneasy that its traditional allies in the region have crumbled. “Look at Syria – it is in shambles. Look at Libya – it is falling apart,” said a scholar close to the foreign ministry. “We want not only to be listened to but also to see our interests and wishes to be taken into consideration.” Mr [Ruslan] Pukhov [member of the Russian defence ministry’s advisory board] said the strained US-Egypt relations had created “a loophole in the regional architecture. Now we are going to use this loophole to restore Russia’s influence in the region.”

Brink: Egypt is at a strategic cross-roads and considering tilting back to Russia

BBC News 2014. (journalist Jonathan Marcus) 13 Feb 2014 “Sisi in Russia: Moscow’s Egyptian Gambit” <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26177792>

Russia and Egypt are talking about stepping up defence cooperation and there could be big arms contracts too. Russian press reports speak of a potential $2bn deal to supply Egypt with advanced aircraft, helicopters and surface-to-air missiles; all to be largely paid for by Saudi Arabia and the UAE - Egypt's allies in the Gulf. So, on one reading, Egypt appears to be at a strategic cross-roads; frustrated with Washington, now tilting back towards Moscow, bringing with it memories of the close ties that existed between Cairo and the Soviet Union prior to the 1970s.

Impact: Russian influence in the Middle East is bad for America – hurts Western interests & ideals

Tom Nichols & John Schindler 2013. (both are  professors of national security at the Naval War College, and fellows of the International History Institute at Boston University ) 16 Sept 2013 America's Middle East Policy Collapses <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/americas-middle-east-policy-collapses-9073>

We share, however, a background in the study of Russia, and it is here that we find the outcome of the Syrian crisis to be so disastrous. For nearly seven decades, American efforts in the Middle East have been based on a bipartisan consensus—one of the few to be found in U.S. foreign policy—aimed at limiting Moscow’s influence in that region. This is a core interest of American foreign policy: it reflects the strategic importance of the region to us and to our allies, as well as the historical reality Russia has continually sought clients there who would oppose both Western interests and ideals.

4. Helping Hamas

Link: Egyptian military is isolating and weakening Hamas (Palestinian terrorist group in Gaza)

Jeremy Sharp 2014. (Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs with Congressional Research Service) 5 June 2014 Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations <http://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33003.pdf>

Since the July 2013 military takeover, Egyptian authorities have reversed the Morsi government’s policy of backing Palestinian Islamist group Hamas (a Muslim Brotherhood offshoot). The current Egyptian rulers see Hamas as a security threat that has aided the Muslim Brotherhood and terrorist groups in the Sinai. Over the past year, the Egyptian military has more forcefully sought to close the underground smuggling trade beneath the Gaza-Egyptian border that Hamas authorities rely upon for supplies and tax revenue. The interim government also has banned Hamas from operating inside Egypt, and the courts have authorized seizures of Hamas’ assets inside Egypt. Although Egyptian military officials have always sought to balance the need to appear loyal to the Palestinian cause without empowering Hamas, this more aggressive containment policy against Hamas has been viewed as effective in contributing to Hamas’ political isolation (other factors such as Hamas’ falling out with the Asad regime in Syria also have contributed to the group’s waning power).

Impact: Hamas commits human rights violations and shoots rockets into Israel

Lawrence J. Haas 2014. ( former communications director for Vice President Al Gore, is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council) Don't Be Fooled by the Hamas-Fatah Union 3 June 2014 US NEWS & WORLD REPORT <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/06/03/fatah-hamas-unity-puts-lie-to-us-middle-east-peace-efforts>

The Fatah-Hamas civil war not only left the Palestinian territories divided. It left Hamas free to pursue a strict Islamist state on its narrow strip of land on the Mediterranean, while harassing, jailing, torturing and killing its opponents. Over the last seven years, Hamas has launched, or permitted other terrorist groups to launch, thousands of rockets into southern Israel, terrorizing the Israeli men, women and children of Sderot and elsewhere. In fact, the rockets continued to fly in recent days as Fatah and Hamas came together.

5. Lost US manufacturing jobs in defense industries

Link & Impact: Cutting aid to Egypt means cutting orders for military equipment in US factories, which means lost jobs.

**Professor Timothy Garton Ash in 2012, although in this article he does not specifically say he agrees with maintaining military aid to Egypt, nevertheless he reports the political analysis that went into the decision to resume aid back in 2012, due to the jobs impact it would have:**

Prof. Timothy Garton Ash 2012. (senior fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University and professor of European studies at Oxford University) Egypt's hold on the U.S., LOS ANGELES TIMES<http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/08/opinion/la-oe-gartonash-lahood-20120308>

Talking of U.S. elections, the experts add one further detail. Much of the $1.3 billion in military aid to Egypt (the rest of the grand total is more conventional economic assistance) comes straight back to American military suppliers. To factories like the General Dynamics one in Lima, Ohio, for example, where (wholly or partly U.S. government-funded) Egyptian army orders for tanks will help keep the production lines going despite Pentagon cutbacks. Risk those American jobs, in the crucial swing state of Ohio in an election year? You must be joking.

6. Loss of military professionalism

Link: US military aid made the Egyptian army capable and professional

Admiral Michael G. Mullen 2011. (US Navy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 16 Feb 2011 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg64862/html/CHRG-112hhrg64862.htm>

Foolhardy would be it for us to make hasty judgments about the benefits, tangible and intangible, that are about to be derived from forging strong military relationships overseas, such as the one we enjoy with Egypt. Changes to those relationships in either aid or assistance ought to be considered only with an abundance of caution and a thorough appreciation for the long view rather than in the flush of public passion and the urgency to save a buck. The $1.3 billion we provide the Egyptian military each year has helped them become the capable, professional force they are, and in that regard has been of incalculable value.

Link: US military aid led to professionalism of the Egyptian army during crisis situations

Robert Gates 2011. (secretary of Defense) 16 Feb 2011 testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, [http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112hhrg64862/html/CHRG-112hhrg64862.htm](http://www.jcs.mil/speech.aspx?id=1534)

And I would tell you the kinds of instability that we are seeing in the Middle East now, it is difficult for me to imagine circumstances in which we would send U.S. ground forces in any of those situations. Those are problems that are emanating from within those countries, and it is primarily a diplomatic challenge for us, although I would say if you ever wanted proof of the value--as the chairman said in his opening statement, of the value of our military assistance to Egypt over the past 30 years, it has been in the behavior of the Egyptian Army over the past 3 weeks and their professionalism in dealing with the kinds of situations they have.

Impact: Human rights. The Egyptian Army protected peaceful protestors during the revolution because of the training they got from the US

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships”<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

Furthermore, U.S. security assistance also often provides critical training that helps professionalize partner militaries and teaches them about core U.S. values like respect for human rights and civilian control of the military. In fact, the Expanded-IMET or E-IMET program is specifically designed to focus on these topics. The influence of our security assistance was evident early this year. During the uprising in Egypt, the Egyptian military responded admirably. It allowed peaceful protests to take place and resisted calls to crack down on the protesters. There are a number of complex factors that explain why the Egyptian military responded the way it did. But it is clear that our long standing ties – our ability to pick up the phone and urge restraint – allowed us to effectively engage the Egyptian military. Additionally, the Egyptians greatly value our security assistance relationship and wanted to ensure it continued.

7. Loss of US influence

Link: Security assistance gives the US leverage and influence

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships” (brackets added)<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

This is because security assistance gives the United States leverage and influence. Our funding helps tie a country’s security sector to the United States, creating strong strategic and financial incentives for the recipient countries to maintain close relations. The linkages through IMET [International Military Education & Training] also help build personal relationships between officer corps, which gives us increased access and potential points of influence.

Link: Military aid creates strong incentive to maintain good ties with the US

Andrew Shapiro 2011. (Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, US State Department) 27 Sept 2011 “The Essential Role of U.S. Security Assistance In Addressing Today's Challenges and Building New Partnerships”<http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rm/174122.htm>

When we provide security assistance through our Foreign Military Financing program to buy U.S. defense systems, we are not just providing a country with weapons systems. We are committing ourselves to a long term relationship. The complex and technical nature of advanced defense systems often require continuous collaboration between countries. This includes training and support in the use of the equipment, assistance in maintenance, and help to update and modernize the equipment throughout its life-cycle. Additionally, programs like the International Military Education and Training program, or IMET, help build military-to-military connections between countries. This program brings foreign military officers to the U.S. to see the practices of our military first-hand. This assistance helps build ties between militaries and creates strong incentives for recipient countries to maintain good ties with the United States.

Impact: US relationship with Egypt is essential to US national security, Middle East stability, and war on terrorism

Dr. Herbert London 2014. (PhD; president emeritus of Hudson Institute; President, London Center for Policy Research; former John M. Olin Professor of Humanities at New York University) Egypt Needs US Aid to Fight Extremism 21 July 2014 <http://www.newsmax.com/HerbertLondon/Middle-East-Egypt-Unrest/2014/07/21/id/583815#ixzz3A6zBfmbG> (the context of this ward is referring to Obama’s temporary suspension of military aid to Egypt)

The Egyptian military has been fighting the very same Al Qaeda network that declared war on America so many years ago, killed thousands of Americans on September 11th, thousands in Iraq, and still attacks our troops in Afghanistan today. As you [Pres. Obama] outlined in your speech at West Point, America should be supporting our allies in our common war on terrorism. Al Qaeda has direct historical and ideological roots to the Islamist movement in Egypt; the mastermind of the September 11th attacks, Mohammed Atta, and the current leader of Al Qaeda, Ayman al-Zawahiri are both Egyptian-born alumni of the Muslim Brotherhood. The mastermind of the first terrorist attack against America, the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing, Omar Abdel-Rahman (“the Blind Sheikh”) was also Egyptian. The secular Egyptian state and America have a common enemy and our partnership is critical to America’s national security interest. Beyond issues of terrorism, the US-Egyptian relationship is vital to other U.S. national interests in the Middle East and has been essential to maintaining security and stability in the region.

Impact: US influence helps reduce terrorism against Israel

Michael Crowley 2013. (chief foreign affairs correspondent) TIME Magazine, 11 July 2013 Obama’s Egypt Policy: The Israel Factor <http://swampland.time.com/2013/07/11/obamas-egypt-policy-the-israel-factor/>

The peace deal, and Washington’s influence over Egypt, helps Israel in other ways. Egyptian forces secure Egypt’s border with Israeli in the Sinai, as well as the nearby border with Gaza, likely preventing terrorist attacks on Israel from the area. Makovsky also notes Egypt’s influence with Palestinian leaders. While its ousted president, Mohamed Morsi, tilted towards the radicals of Hamas, Egypt’s military and its political allies are closer to the moderate Palestinian president, Mahmoud Abbas, who was [quick to](http://www.maannews.net/eng/ViewDetails.aspx?ID=611048) “congratulate the Egyptian leadership in this transitional phase of its history.”

Impact: Instability & Terrorism. US partnership with Egypt promotes stability and counters terrorism.

Matthew Craig Axelrod 2011. (master’s degree candidate, Univ. of Pennsylvania), April 2011 Aid as Leverage? - Understanding the U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship <http://lauder.wharton.upenn.edu/pages/pdf/other/Axelrod.pdf>

Both the United States and Egypt have benefited from a thirty-year-old strategic relationship. U.S. Ambassador to Egypt Francis Ricciardone explained the benefits and the importance of aid to Egypt in a 2007 memo to the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance:  
Egyptian strategic partnership played a central role in promoting peace and stability, countering extremism and terrorism, and creating an environment in which political and economic reforms can prosper. A key pillar of the relationship, U.S. economic and security assistance both symbolizes and vastly strengthens our nation's historic cooperation and long-term commitment to the partnership.  
While many would have taken issue that political and economic reforms could possibly prosper under former President Hosni Mubarak, it was not easy to disagree that Egypt supported the regional strategic goals of the United States.

8. Terrorism in Egypt. Weakening the Egyptian military by denying aid hurts its internal fight against radical Islamic terrorists

Dr. Herbert London 2014. (PhD; president emeritus of Hudson Institute; President, London Center for Policy Research; former John M. Olin Professor of Humanities at New York University) Egypt Needs US Aid to Fight Extremism 21 July 2014 <http://www.newsmax.com/HerbertLondon/Middle-East-Egypt-Unrest/2014/07/21/id/583815#ixzz3A6zBfmbG>   (the context of this ward is referring to Obama’s temporary suspension of military aid to Egypt)

Mr. President, instead of supporting the Egyptian military, your Administration has chosen to punish it by withholding the military aid that has consistently provided to Egypt since 1979. Presumably those in your administration believe that by not supporting the military, you are preserving democracy.  We contend that by withholding Apache helicopters that are so desperately needed to fight militants in the Sinai, you are imperiling Egyptian security and creating a dangerous vacuum in the region that actually invites terrorism. Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other militant extremist groups that have declared war against America, haven’t changed their minds about who they are fighting. Egypt is fighting the very same ideological movement that killed thousands of Americans in 2001 and thousands elsewhere around the globe in Pakistan, Mali, Nigeria, Iraq, Libya, and especially Syria.